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I. INTRODUCTION  
The process for negotiating and implementing the Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control (“FCTC”), the world’s first public 
health treaty and the first adopted under the auspices of the World 
Health Organization (“WHO”), has been characterized by novel 
features of secrecy and exclusion that cannot be reconciled with 
accepted norms of international lawmaking. The FCTC’s stated 
objective is to progressively reduce tobacco consumption “by 
providing a framework for tobacco control measures to be 
implemented by the Parties at the national, regional, and international 
levels.”1 That goal has significant economic implications that impact 
groups ranging from tobacco farmers to wholesalers to importers - yet 
blanket bans on public and media access have wholly excluded 
impacted groups from having any voice in, or even the ability to 
monitor, ongoing deliberations. In a clear and unabashed exercise of 
viewpoint discrimination, only favored NGOs that uniformly espouse 
swift and universal eradication of all tobacco products without regard 
to economic consequences have been exempted and allowed to 
participate in implementation proceedings. Even more extraordinarily, 
the FCTC’s “Conference of the Parties” (“COP”)—the international 
lawmaking body charged with elaborating and implementing the 
FCTC2—has advocated increasingly strident measures designed to 
render tobacco interests, and all who associate with them, 
international pariahs who are not merely excluded from deliberations 
but also incapable of speaking: to international negotiators, to 
domestic lawmakers, or even to the consumers of their products. 
You might be thinking that if all this has really been happening, 
surely you would have heard of it before. But the truth is that the 
aforementioned public and media bans have proven very effective at 
discouraging mainstream media coverage of FCTC proceedings.  
What news organization has the cash to spare to send a reporter 
overseas to cover an event into which the reporter will not be 
admitted, to write a story that is virtually guaranteed to be limited by 
a near-total lack of access, concerning a treaty that few among the 
reading public even know about? In addition, no one (myself 
                                                                                                             
1.  WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control art. 3, May 21, 2003-June 29, 
2004, 2302 U.N.T.S. 166 [hereinafter FCTC], http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework
/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/8F7B-BYAP] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018).    
2. Id. art. 23. 
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included) particularly relishes the thought of speaking out in what 
might be perceived to be a defense of highly disfavored tobacco 
interests. 
It is high time, however, that serious scholarship set anti-tobacco 
prejudices aside and begin doing what scholarship at its best always 
does: shed light on an FCTC implementation process that has 
increasingly drifted in recent years from established norms of 
international lawmaking, and critically examine whether the most 
notable departures are justified. The time could not be riper for a 
fulsome examination, as the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on 
the Right to Food recently recommended that the FCTC be used as a 
model for the negotiation of other multilateral health instruments,3 
and in November 2016 the head of the WHO FCTC Secretariat 
opened the seventh Conference of the Parties (“COP7”) with a 
declaration that the sugar and alcohol industries should consider 
themselves next in line for a similar international convention.4 Before 
the process is in fact replicated, a serious and scholarly examination is 
warranted. 
Scholarship concerning FCTC implementation is also timely 
because certain delegations at COP7 began, for the first time, to make 
serious objections to procedural and legal irregularities in the manner 
in which implementation deliberations were being conducted.5 Many 
objecting delegations at COP7 lacked the support of on-the-ground 
legal teams because their countries could not afford them, forcing 
them either to act without the benefit of legal counsel, or to rely on 
partisan NGOs—or the equally partisan WHO Secretariat—for legal 
guidance.6 These delegations deserve access to constructive scholarly 
                                                                                                             
3. Hilal Elver (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food), Interim Rep. on the Right to 
Food, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/71/282 (Aug. 3, 2016).  
4. Dr. Vera de Costa e Silva, Head of the Convention Secretariat on Tobacco Control, 
Address at the Seventh Session of the Conference of Parties to the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3 (Nov. 9, 2018) [hereinafter FCTC/COP
/7/DIV/3], http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_DIV3_EN.pdf?ua=1 [https://
perma.cc/79UE-9LJA] (archived Mar. 4, 2018). 
5.  A New Kind of COP with New Challenges, Framework Convention Alliance Bull. 
No. 134 (Nov. 12, 2016) [hereinafter Framework Convention Alliance Bull], 
http://www.fctc.org/publications/meeting-resources/cop7-bulletins/1496-a-new-kind-of-cop-
with-new-challenges [https://perma.cc/32GF-EHXU] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (criticizing 
delegations for “raising procedural or legalistic arguments” and for “proposing provocative 
new language when Parties were close to agreement on a controversial item”). 
6. From the inception of FCTC negotiations, many countries with limited financial 
resources have been able to send only one or two delegates to negotiating sessions, and have 
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criticism providing a less insular view, and that can place the various 
novel features of recent FCTC implementation deliberations within 
the broader context of standard approaches to multilateral treaty 
making. 
I am uniquely positioned—and perhaps uniquely responsible—to 
shed some of the requisite scholarly light. From 2001 to 2003, I 
served on the US delegation that helped negotiate the FCTC. Shortly 
after the negotiations concluded, I published an article arguing that 
the FCTC as finally adopted was substantively beneficial, yet was the 
product of a “deeply flawed [negotiation] process” that was both 
“broken” and “inefficient.”7 I urged then that the broken negotiating 
structure should not be replicated or used as a model for future 
negotiations, predicting that doing so would result in further warping 
of established norms of international lawmaking, and would in the 
long run generate poor and perhaps even extreme policy results.8 
Having issued this warning, I left the stage of international 
lawmaking for more than a decade and did not look back. Just ahead 
of COP7 in 2016, however, I was contacted by the Reason 
Foundation, which inquired whether I would be willing to revisit my 
previous scholarship and analyze whether in light of subsequent 
developments my 2004 predictions have essentially come true. This 
Article is the product of that prompting, as well as a deep dive into 
the last twelve years of FCTC implementation deliberations, to the 
extent information on those deliberations could be obtained in the 
face of the increasingly cloistered and one-sided negotiation process. 
To be clear, I am not an epidemiologist, and this Article will not 
opine on public health outcomes (although my admittedly amateur 
view is that the experienced and dedicated public health officials who 
dominate FCTC negotiations have adopted and promoted many 
worthy ideas concerning tobacco control policy over the course of the 
last decade.) I am, however, a student of and former participant in the 
making of international law and it is from that perspective that this 
article argues that the FCTC implementation process must be 
reformed to incorporate basic norms of transparency and deliberative 
process. 
                                                                                                             
had to make do without legal counsel.  See Gregory F. Jacob, Without Reservation, 5 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 287, 290, 296 (2004). 
7. Id. at 288-89.  
8. Id.  
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II.  BACKGROUND CONCERNING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 
FCTC 
 As previously noted, the FCTC is the first international health 
treaty negotiated under the auspices of the WHO, a venerable 
international body established in 1948 that is dedicated to promoting 
global public health.9 The FCTC purports “to promote measures of 
tobacco control based on current and relevant scientific, technical and 
economic considerations.”10 To that end, the FCTC’s self-declared 
objective is to “provid[e] a framework for tobacco control measures 
to be implemented by the Parties at the national, regional and 
international levels in order to reduce continually and substantially 
the prevalence of tobacco use and exposure to tobacco smoke.”11 The 
treaty thus expressly contemplates ongoing international and domestic 
law processes to tailor and refine the principles set forth in the 
framework convention for implementation and adoption at the 
national level. 
The FCTC entered into force on February 27, 2005,12 and as of 
the date of this Article’s publication has 180 parties. (The United 
States signed the treaty in 2004, but is not a party because it has not 
yet ratified it).13 Article 23 of the FCTC established the COP to 
continue work on the international aspects of FCTC implementation, 
directing that it “shall keep under regular review the implementation 
of the Convention and take the decisions necessary to promote its 
effective implementation and may adopt protocols, annexes and 
amendments to the Convention..”14 The COP is also empowered to 
establish (and has established) subsidiary bodies to help carry out the 
COP’s work and achieve the Convention’s objectives.15 There have 
been seven  COPs since the FCTC went into effect; the first was held 
in Geneva in 2006 to establish rules of procedure to govern future 
COPs, and subsequent COPs were held in Bangkok (2007), Durban 
                                                                                                             
9.   FCTC, supra note 1, Foreword, at v. 
10. FCTC, supra note 1, Preamble, at 3.  
11. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 3, at 5. 
12. FCTC, supra note 1.  
13. WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Status of Treaties, U.N. Treaty 
Collection, https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20I/Chapter%20IX/IX-
4.en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DNJ3-WZS6 ] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
14. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 23.5, at 21. 
15. FCTC, supra note1, art. 23.5(f), at 22. 
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(2008), Punta del Este (2010), Seoul (2012), Moscow (2014), and 
Delhi (2016).16 
The FCTC recognizes, however, that the on-the-ground work of 
tobacco control must primarily be done at the national level, through 
“nationally developed strategies,” “national coordinating 
mechanism[s],” and “legislative, executive, administrative and/or 
other measures” that are exclusively creatures of domestic law.17 
Indeed, as my I argued in my previous article on the subject, the 
FCTC is peculiar among multilateral treaties in that it “has 
remarkably little to do with international relations, and primarily 
covers matters pertaining purely to domestic law. Virtually every 
provision of the treaty could be enacted into law by willing countries, 
even in the treaty’s absence.”18 The individual work of the sovereign 
parties to the Convention at the national level is thus necessarily the 
primary driver of treaty implementation. 
III.  DIPLOMACY AS A TWO-LEVEL GAME, AND FCTC 
NEGOTIATION DYNAMICS 
The fact that the FCTC is an international instrument that 
addresses almost exclusively domestic law subjects has resulted in 
markedly unusual negotiation dynamics. In his seminal article 
concerning the application of game theory to diplomatic affairs, 
Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games,19 
Robert Putnam convincingly argued that “[d]omestic politics and 
international relations are often somehow entangled.,” with 
negotiators making strategic moves at one level (say, in international 
treaty negotiations) primarily for the purpose of improving their 
strategic position at the other level (say, in domestic law making).20 
                                                                                                             
16. Sessions of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/sessions/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/73WA-FDLD] (Mar. 4, 2018).  
17. See, e.g., FCTC supra note 1, art 4.1, at 5 (“effective legislative, executive, 
administrative or other measures should be contemplated at the appropriate governmental 
level”); art. 4.2 (“at the national, regional and international levels”); art.  4.4, at 6 (“at the 
national, regional and international levels”); art. 4.5, at 6 (“as determined by each party within 
its jurisdiction”); art. 4.6, at 6 (“in the context of nationally developed strategies”); art. 5.2, at 7 
(“a national coordinating mechanism”). 
18. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 288.  
19. See generally Robert Putnam, Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-
level games, 42 INT’L ORG. 427 (1988). 
20. Id. at 427. 
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From the outset, that dynamic has been fully on display in FCTC 
negotiations. 
Because the FCTC is the world’s first public health treaty and as 
originally conceived was supposed to primarily entail the 
development of model public health measures relating to tobacco 
consumption, most countries sent their public health ministers as their 
national representatives to negotiate the treaty.21 This basic 
representational structure has continued throughout the COP 
implementation process. Consequently, virtually every aspect of 
FCTC implementation is dominated by public health officials who 
when they arrive at the COPs, get to step out of the pitched battles of 
domestic politics they are used to fighting at home—in which they are 
constantly required to contend with opposing forces representing 
interests such as jobs, trade, intellectual property, and economic 
growth—and step instead into a gathering of almost entirely like-
minded individuals who bear similar scars from frustrating domestic 
political experiences back home.22 
As it turns out—and as Putnam might have predicted— this 
collection of public health ministers has shown a marked proclivity to 
use the treaty-making and implementation process to achieve 
domestic policy goals that they have previously proved unable to 
convince their home governments to adopt through domestic 
lawmaking processes.23 Some delegations have even expressly stated 
this intention, arguing that various treaty provisions should be 
tightened or strengthened so that their home governments could not 
interpret their way out of them.24 These delegations, in other words, 
are (at least occasionally) using the COP implementation process to 
impose international law obligations on the nations they represent that 
their home governments would on balance prefer not to have.25 Small 
                                                                                                             
21. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 290. 
22. Id. at 297-99. 
23. See id. at 297-98. 
24. Jacob, supra, note 6, at 298 (“It quickly became clear that many of the delegates had 
experienced frustration in the past in trying to persuade their home governments to adopt 
strong anti-tobacco measures. These delegates saw the FCTC as an opportunity to do an end-
run around their governments by inserting strong anti-tobacco measures into the Convention 
and then relying on international political pressure to force their governments to join it. Some 
of the delegates openly admitted their ulterior agendas, making plaintive appeals from the floor 
of the negotiations that strong language be inserted in the treaty so that they could force the 
hand of their government back home.”).  
25. See id. 
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wonder that such delegations regularly advocate for strict limits on 
public access to, and media coverage of, their activities. 
Two additional groups that also exert significant influence over 
the course of FCTC implementation—the FCTC Secretariat, and a 
coalition of more than 500 anti-tobacco NGOs that calls itself the 
“Framework Convention Alliance”—have also demonstrated a 
proclivity to use the FCTC implementation process for the purpose of 
securing domestic law victories that had long proved elusive. 
Although these groups have very little formal power in COP 
deliberations, as they are not parties to the Convention and thus lack 
the power to vote, their soft power is considerable. The Secretariat 
sets the default COP agenda, and both the Secretariat and the NGOs 
frequently draft the base working documents that subsequently frame 
the deliberations of the COP and its subsidiary working group 
bodies.26 Indeed, the power of the Secretariat and the NGOs during 
implementation deliberations has been further magnified by the 
absence of trained diplomats and lawyers from most delegations.27 
Smaller delegations, already ripe for NGO capture because of basic 
alignment of viewpoint, often rely almost exclusively on the 
Secretariat and the NGOs for legal advice concerning treaty 
implementation, even though both play a highly partisan role in the 
implementation process and have a poor track record of providing 
neutral and disinterested advice.28 
Like the COP delegations, the Secretariat and the NGOs are 
dominated by public health advocates.29 These advocates have 
extensive scientific knowledge concerning the medical and 
sociological consequences of tobacco use and the relative 
                                                                                                             
26. See About the WHO FCTC Secretariat, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control, http://www.who.int/fctc/secretariat/about/en/ [https://perma.cc/9DDA-XHF8] (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2018); see also What Is The Framework Convention Alliance?, Framework 
Convention Alliance, http://www.fctc.org/about-fca [https://perma.cc/X8T8-QU4N] (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2018).  
27. See Jacob, supra note 6, at 290, 296. 
28. See id. at 297 (“I greatly sympathized with the cause espoused by the NGOs in 
Geneva. Setting my own policy preferences aside, however, it is clear to me that it is not in the 
interests of the United States to participate in negotiations where NGOs exert tremendous 
influence over large numbers of delegates not because they are right on matters of substance, 
but rather because they are providing the only pro bono legal services available to delegates 
with no legal experience of their own. In filling this role, the NGOs certainly did not act as 
disinterested legal advisors, and along the way more than one delegation was hoodwinked into 
believing the NGOs’ all-too-frequently distorted versions of the truth.”); id. at 295-96 
(providing specific examples). 
29. See id. at 295; see also About the WHO FCTC Secretariat, supra note 26. 
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effectiveness of various cessation strategies, but they have little or no 
training in or knowledge of regulatory law, trade policy, intellectual 
property, job creation, or other economic impacts of tobacco control 
measures. Those, of course, are precisely the competing interests that 
domestic governments typically must grapple with, analyze, and 
balance in developing workable tobacco policy. From the perspective 
of the Secretariat and the NGOs, the COP thus represents a unique 
opportunity to sidestep the turbulent cut and thrust of domestic 
lawmaking, and to instead make their case to an international supra-
legislature composed primarily of public health ministers that 
fundamentally agree with them on all core issues. 
IV. FROM OPEN MEETINGS TO MEETINGS OPEN TO THE 
FAVORED FEW 
In light of this tripartite, homogenous, coalition of the willing—
health minister delegates, partisan Secretariat, and aligned NGOs—
the one thing that might threaten to disrupt a steadfast march toward 
adoption of their preferred policy agenda would be a reintroduction of 
the voices of those economically impacted interests that have 
historically provided a policy counterbalance in domestic politics. 
Like many embattled interest groups before them, the anti-tobacco 
coalition determined at the outset of the FCTC implementation 
process that one of the easiest ways to ensure achievement of their 
policy goals would be to simply ban all of the groups they perceive to 
be “the opposition”—ban them from participating, ban them from 
watching, ban their domestic governments from talking to them, ban 
the public (which just might after all have been infiltrated by the 
forces of the opposition!), and ban the media from covering the vast 
majority of FCTC proceedings. 
Perhaps most troubling of all, Article 5.3 of the FCTC, which 
received scant attention during the drafting of the Convention, has 
been weaponized and transformed into something it was never 
intended to be: a mandate that anyone who dares even to associate 
with tobacco interests be treated as pariahs who must be completely 
excluded from participating in international and domestic lawmaking 
processes relating to tobacco control.30 Even Interpol (yes, Interpol!) 
has been prohibited from providing input to the COP on combating 
illicit trade in tobacco products, for the sole reason that it has the 
                                                                                                             
30. See infra Part V. 
678 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:669 
temerity to work with the tobacco industry to track tobacco 
shipments.31 And in the months before COP7, the Secretariat pushed 
to force State Parties to excise from their sovereignly selected 
delegations government officials with ties of any kind even to state-
owned tobacco interests, expressly threatening to deny such delegates 
diplomatic credentials and the ability to access or participate in 
negotiating sessions.32 
While I am sympathetic to the core public health goals being 
pursued by the anti-tobacco coalition, this article sounds a clarion call 
of warning for those who care about the process by which 
international law is made. Dislike of the tobacco industry should not 
blind us to the deeply problematic means increasingly being 
employed by the dominant FCTC interest groups to warp 
international and domestic lawmaking processes in ways they believe 
will help them achieve their short-term policy goals. 
A substantial and growing scholarship shows that open decision-
making processes characterized by transparency tend to produce 
markedly better policy outcomes than processes that are hidden or 
shielded from public view.33 Indeed, the WHO is well aware of 
transparency’s power. One of the WHO’s foundational governing 
principles holds that “[i]nformed opinion and active co-operation on 
the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement 
of the health of the people.”34 The WHO purports to champion that 
principle by regularly advocating for transparency in the 
implementation of public health measures.35 Even the FCTC 
                                                                                                             
31. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text. 
32. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Maximizing Transparency of 
Parties’ Delegations, Intergovernmental Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations and 
Civil Society Groups During Sessions of the COP and Meetings of its Subsidiary Bodies, ¶¶ 7-
14, FCTC/COP/7/30 (July 13, 2016) [hereinafter FCTC/COP/7/30].  
33. See, e.g., Dov Seidman, The Transformative Power of Transparency, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 23, 2014) (noting that transparency improves healthcare outcomes); Jake Rosenfeld & 
Patrick Denice, The Power of Transparency: Evidence from a British Workplace Survey, 80 
AMERICAN SOC. REV. 1045 (2015); Abhijit Banerjee, Rema Hanna, Jordan C. Kyle, Benjamin 
A. Olken & Sudarno Sumarto, The Power of Transparency: Information, Identification Cards 
and Food Subsidy Programs in Indonesia (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 20923, 2015). 
34.   Constitution of the World Health Organization: Principles, WORLD HEALTH 
ORGANIZATION [WHO], http://www.who.int/about/mission/en/ (last visited February 5, 2018).  
35.  See, e.g., The world health report 2002 - Reducing Risks, Promoting Healthy Life, 
WHO, http://www.who.int/whr/2002/en/ [https://perma.cc/CL9W-TM5L] (last visited Mar. 4, 
2018) (“Trust can only be generated by openness. . . . [and]the public should be trusted to 
respond rationally to openness.”); WHO calls for increased transparency in medical research, 
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Secretariat recognizes that transparency is a virtue; it recently 
published a report calling for “maximizing transparency of Parties’ 
delegations, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental 
organizations and civil society groups during sessions of the COP and 
meetings of subsidiary bodies” so that industry attempts to subvert 
sound tobacco control policy can be identified and avoided.36 The 
FCTC’s expert group has similarly called for “systematic and 
transparent” analysis of evidence and for “coordinated and transparent 
application” of treaty provisions.37 A fair examination of the FCTC 
implementation process, however, reveals that the WHO and the COP 
have not remotely been practicing what they preach. 
Rule 32 of the procedural rules adopted at COP1 state that 
“[s]essions of the Conference of the Parties shall be held in public, 
unless the Conference of the Parties decides that they shall be 
restricted.”38 The same rules apply to meetings of subsidiary bodies of 
the COP.39 In effect, these rules established a presumption that all 
meetings of the COP and its subsidiary bodies should be public 
meetings, unless circumstances justify the COP restricting them 
through a consensus vote instead. 
Rule 2 provides added meaning to the terms “public” and 
“restricted.” Rule 2 defines public meetings as “sessions or meetings 
that are open to attendance by Parties, States and regional economic 
integration organizations that are not Parties, the Secretariat, 
intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations accredited by 
the Conference of the Parties pursuant to Rule 31 and members of the 
public.”40 Restricted meetings are defined as those “held for a specific 
                                                                                                             
MEDIA CENTRE OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (Apr. 2015),  
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/notes/2015/medical-research-transparency/en/ [https://
perma.cc/FE3X-55CM] (last visited Mar. 4, 2018); Transparency during public health 
emergencies: from rhetoric to reality, 87 BULLETIN OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 
[WHO] 614-18 (2009), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/87/8/08-056689/en/ 
[https://perma.cc/MKM7-P87Z] (last visited September 25, 2016).   
36. See FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32.  
37.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTF], Impact assessment of the 
WHO FCTC: Report by the Expert Group, FCTC/COP/7/6 (July 27, 2016) [hereinafter FCTC/
COP/7/6], http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_6_EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8TZE-KWBT] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).  
38.  Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, R. 32, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (2006), 
http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop_rop_text_english.pdf [https://perma.cc/58UR-FFLT] (last 
visited Mar. 4, 2018). 
39. Id. R. 25(3). 
40. Id. R. 2(10). 
680 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:669 
purpose and under exceptional circumstances that are open to 
attendance by Parties and essential Secretariat staff.”41 These 
definitions lend further weight to Rule 32’s strong presumption that 
the COPs should conduct most of their work through meetings that 
are open to the public, by limiting “restricted” meetings to those held 
“for a specific purpose” and where “exceptional circumstances” exist. 
 At COP5, however, the proceedings of virtually all subsidiary 
body meetings were conducted in a manner that did not conform to 
these authorized formats.42 Without amending the governing Rules of 
Procedure, the COP implemented a new and unauthorized meeting 
format that excluded the public and the media, but permitted favored 
observers and NGOs to attend and participate.43 The justification 
given for this departure from the rules was that the tobacco industry 
might otherwise send observers to watch (yes, watch!) the 
proceedings.44 Exclusion of the public and the media was thus the 
                                                                                                             
41. Id. R. 2(11). 
42. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Possible amendments to the 
Rules of Procedure of the Conference of the Parties, at 3, FCTC/COP/6/28 (July 11, 2014), 
(proposing amendment to Rule 2 that “would recognize current practice for subsidiary bodies 
typically established as ‘working groups,’ where the public is not invited to attend.”); 
Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Report to the fifth session of the 
Conference of the Parties of the Chairperson of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Body on a 
Protocol on Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products, ¶ 10, FCTC/COP/5/7 (May 11, 2012) (“On the 
first day, the INB decided to continue its practice of the two previous sessions to exclude the 
public from observing the proceedings of the INB.”). 
43. Id. (stating that the newly defined “open” session format, which had already become 
the “current practice for subsidiary bodies,” would allow only the following entities to attend:  
“Parties, States and regional economic integration organizations that are not Parties, the 
Secretariat, intergovernmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations that have 
observer status pursuant to Rules 30 and 31”); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
[FCTC], Report of the sixth session of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC (2014), 
¶ 165 (Oct. 2014) (“[m]embers of the media would be considered as members of the public”) 
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_Report-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/JM8R-
S8FC] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); Id. ¶ 166 (summarizing debates over whether the general 
public should be permitted to attend even COP plenary sessions, in the face of arguments that 
“the admission of persons with links to the tobacco industry could hamper, or in some cases 
even threaten, the work of the COP”). 
44. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Conference of the Parties to 
the WHO FCTC, Sixth Session, Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings, at 18 (Oct. 2014) 
(remarks of delegate Heyward of Australia) (“You will recall that at COP5 and some sessions 
of the INB on the protocol of illicit trade and tobacco products, valuable working time was 
taken up with consideration of whether to exclude the public from meetings. The decisions to 
exclude the public were prompted by concern at large numbers of tobacco industry 
representatives among public attendees, but had the effect of also excluding academics, 
students, and other members of civil society.”); id. at 20 (remarks of delegate Ndyanabangi of 
Uganda) (“We know from our history how members of delegations could not contribute 
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only way to ensure that the tobacco industry could reliably be kept 
out.45 
At COP6, an amendment to the rules was adopted to provide a 
legal basis for this alternate meeting format, called “open,” which 
describes “sessions or meetings that are open to attendance by Parties, 
States and regional economic integration organizations that are not 
Parties, the Secretariat, intergovernmental organizations and 
nongovernmental organizations that have observer status.”46 Rule 32 
was not amended, however, thus leaving intact the presumption in the 
original Rules of Procedure favoring open meetings absent 
“exceptional circumstances,” a “specific purpose,” and a consensus 
decision to keep the public and the media out. Nevertheless, the 
Convention Secretariat noted in a report issued ahead of COP7 that 
“the last two COP sessions decided to close meetings to the public,” 
and predicted a “high likelihood of another such decision by the 
Parties in the forthcoming COP sessions”47 And that is precisely what 
happened, although no specific purpose or exceptional circumstances 
were cited in support of COP7’s decision.48 
Nor is that the end of measures taken to minimize public 
scrutiny of COP deliberations. COP5 ended the previous practice of 
including in the summary records of subsidiary body meetings 
“[e]ach speaker’s intervention,” which were recorded and provided 
for the purpose of “obtain[ing] an accurate and detailed summary of 
                                                                                                             
because of big tobacco being among the public, and we should not underestimate the power of 
the tobacco industry, especially at a political level, that we may have some delegations who 
may not be able to express their opinions because of the tobacco control efforts back in their 
capitals. … I think until we have amended the Rules of Procedure and we are very clear that 
the methods of screening are thorough, we should not allow members of the public to continue 
attending the present session, because we may as well have members of the tobacco industry 
within the public and they will hinder the discussions of the meetings of this COP.”); id. at 21 
(statement of Mr. Solomon of the WHO Office of Legal Counsel) (“The fourth thing being 
discussed is a proposal to adopt a decision that was taken in COP5 and at the 
intergovernmental negotiating bodies for the Protocol, which would be to exclude members of 
the public on an ad hoc basis until a decision on this matter is reached.”). 
45. See id. 
46.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Amendments to the Rules of 
Procedure of the Conference of  the Parties to the WHO FCTC, FCTC/COP6(24) (Oct. 18, 
2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/146108/1/FCTC_COP6%2824%29-en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/29XC-8EG5] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).  
47. FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32, ¶ 4. 
48. Kevin Mooney, Taxpayer-funded U.N. anti-tobacco convention closes out the press, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 1, 2016), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/taxpayer-funded-un-
anti-tobacco-convention-closes-out-the-press/article/2606161 [https://perma.cc/CQE3-L984] 
(archived Mar. 4, 2018). 
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the debate.”49 That change was significant because the vast majority 
of the detail work of Convention implementation occurs at subsidiary 
body meetings, and the detailed records allowed those not personally 
present in the room to follow the course of the debate, and to know 
which countries were responsible for the various proposals and 
negotiating positions. The Convention Secretariat also proposed at 
COP5 to abandon the required production of verbatim records of COP 
sessions, labeling the proposal an “efficiency measure” even though it 
was forced to admit that the cost to produce the verbatim records was 
in fact quite small.50 At COP7 the Convention Secretariat went 
further, proposing amendments to the rules that would eliminate all 
verbatim reporting of FCTC policymaking.51 The COP adopted the 
proposed amendment with respect to discussions and debates in 
subsidiary bodies, although it decided to keep verbatim reporting for 
the typically more anodyne plenary sessions.52 
V. PURIFYING THE PARTICIPANTS: ARTICLE 5.3 AND THE 
TEST FOR TAINT AS A REQUIREMENT FOR ADMISSION TO 
TOBACCO POLICY DELIBERATIONS AT THE INTERNATIONAL 
AND NATIONAL LEVEL 
Since the FCTC went into force, the WHO FCTC Secretariat and 
aligned NGOs have waged an open campaign to adopt highly 
aggressive interpretations of the FCTC and its procedural rules 
intended to isolate disfavored tobacco interests and completely ban 
them from all forms of participation in public policy debates, at both 
the international and the domestic level. Dr. Vera da Costa e Silva, 
                                                                                                             
49. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Proposed workplan and 
budget for the  financial period 2014–2015, FCTC/COP/5/23 (Sept. 4, 2012) [hereinafter 
FCTC/COP/5/23], http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop5/FCTC_COP5_23-en.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PKE3-3BF7] (archived Mar. 4, 2018); see also Framework Convention on Tobacco 
Control [FCTC], Performance report for the 2010–2011 workplan and budget, 
FCTC/COP/5/19 (June 30, 2012), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/75815/1/FCTC
_COP5_19-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/DD3R-F3YR] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).  
50. FCTC/COP/5/23, supra note 49, ¶ 20. The Secretariat acknowledged that “the actual 
cost of the production of the verbatim records as currently produced may not be seen as 
significant . . . because it  normally represents approximately US$ 20,000–US$ 25,000, 
excluding costs for printing and dispatch.” Id. 
51. FCTC, Possible amendments, supra note 42. 
52.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Report of the seventh session 
of the Conference of the Parties to the WHO FCTC, at 121-22, FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3 (Nov. 
2016), http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FINAL_COP7_REPORT_EN.pdf?ua=1 [https://
perma.cc/HB4D-UMAS] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).  
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Head of the Convention Secretariat, made this approach plain in her 
opening speech to COP7:  
There is another observer here too, although its representatives 
may not always wear badges. The tobacco industry takes a very 
keen interest in COP meetings and makes every effort to 
insinuate itself into delegations and proceedings. If anyone 
doubts the importance of what we do here, always remember the 
industry’s malevolent presence and the strong need for 
transparency.53  
(Transparency for tobacco interests, that is—not for the Secretariat, 
the NGOs, or the COP.) The Framework Convention Alliance echoed 
a similar sentiment in its closing words for COP7, lamenting 
“delegates who are faced with tobacco industry interference in their 
home countries”—“interference” being the term that the Alliance 
regularly use to describe any expression of opposing viewpoints.54 
In recent years, Article 5.3 of the FCTC has emerged as the 
primary international law weapon of those seeking to gag and exclude 
tobacco interests. As one NGO put it, “the FCTC includes a critical 
provision—Article 5.3—that recognizes the tobacco industry’s 
irreconcilable conflict of interest with public health. The article is the 
backbone of the treaty; the treaty cannot succeed if industry 
interference is not rooted out.”55 Not expressly stated, but implicit in 
these strategies, is the knowledge that it is far easier to win a policy 
debate if there is no opposing interest—for example, no poor tobacco 
farmer whose livelihood is at risk of being lost if policy changes are 
implemented without due regard for transitional needs—to express 
economic, due process, free speech, liberty, or other similar concerns. 
Article 5.3 is a markedly strange choice of vehicle for such a 
campaign of silence, as the unassuming provision received scant 
attention during the FCTC negotiations. As adopted, Article 5.3 
provides that “[i]n setting and implementing their public health 
policies with respect to tobacco control, Parties shall act to protect 
these policies from commercial and other vested interests of the 
                                                                                                             
53.  See FCTC/COP/7/DIV/3, supra note 4.  
54.  See Framework Convention Alliance Bull, supra note 5.  
55. See, e.g., Roadmap to Protecting Health from Big Tobacco, CORP.ACCOUNTABILITY 
INT’L (Sept. 2017) [hereinafter CAI Roadmap], https://www.corporateaccountability.org/wp-
content/uploads/2017/09/map_booklet_en_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9C2-ZB4H] (archived 
Mar. 4, 2018)  
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tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”56 Although this 
language was amended a handful of times during the course of the 
treaty negotiations, Article 5.3 was never viewed by negotiators as 
establishing one of the treaty’s core substantive obligations, and no 
INB breakout sessions were dedicated to shaping its language.57 
In the consolidated Chair’s Text released ahead of INB5, Article 
5.3’s precursor provided that “[i]n setting and implementing their 
public health policies, the Parties shall avoid harmful interference by 
the tobacco industry.”58 That language was considered too strong by 
many delegations, particularly those with national constitutions that 
mandate transparent governance processes and vest all lawful 
stakeholders with civic participation rights. Article 5.3 was 
accordingly softened in its final version by removing the terms 
“avoid,” “harmful,” and “interference” from the Chair’s Text, and by 
adding the expressly stated limitation that protective measures 
adopted pursuant to Article 5.3 need only be implemented “in 
accordance with national law.”59 
No delegation participating in the INBs ever suggested that 
Article 5.3 should be read to mandate a general ban on all tobacco 
industry participation in (or even passive observation of!) 
international and domestic policymaking relating to tobacco control.60 
Such a provision could never have been adopted, and the final text 
says nothing of the sort.61 The final language of Article 5.3 is, 
however, not a model of clarity, and advocates (led by the Secretariat 
and the NGOs) have stepped into the interpretive void and twisted the 
nebulous provision’s meaning beyond recognition to serve their own 
ends. 
Most prominent among the official FCTC documents that 
purport to interpret and implement Article 5.3 are the “Guidelines for 
Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on 
                                                                                                             
56. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 5.3. 
57. A review of the records of the FCTC’s INB breakout sessions reveals that none were 
dedicated to shaping Article 5.3.  Assertions in the text about the views of the FCTC 
negotiators are supported by the absence of contrary statements in the negotiating records, as 
well as by the author’s own personal observations as one of the FCTC negotiators. 
58.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC), Guidelines for implementation 
of Article 5.3 of the  WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (Oct. 22, 2002) 
[hereinafter Art. 5.3 Guidelines], http://www.who.int/fctc/guidelines/article_5_3.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/J6AC-7W86] (archived Mar. 4, 2018).   
59. Compare FCTC, supra note 1, art 5.3, at 7, with Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58.  
60. See supra note 57.  
61. The text of Article 5.3 speaks for itself.  Otherwise, see supra note 57. 
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Tobacco Control” (“Article 5.3 Guidelines”) which were drafted 
between COP2 and COP3,62 and were adopted by the COP in 
November 2008.63 The Article 5.3 Guidelines call for, inter alia, 
“establish[ing] measures to limit interactions with the tobacco 
industry and ensure the transparency of those interactions that occur,” 
“denormaliz[ing] and, to the extent possible, regulat[ing] activities 
described as ‘socially responsible’ by the tobacco industry, including 
but not limited to activities described as ‘corporate social 
responsibility,’” and “reject[ing] partnerships and non-binding or non-
enforceable agreements with the tobacco industry.”64 According to 
the Article 5.3 Guidelines, these and its multitude of other 
recommended measures “aim at protecting against interference not 
only by the tobacco industry but also, as appropriate, by organizations 
and individuals that work to further the interests of the tobacco 
industry.”65 
A. Application of Article 5.3 to Achieve Purity and Isolation at the 
International Level 
The various measures recommended in the Article 5.3 
Guidelines and similar FCTC implementation documents are neither 
mandatory nor binding.  Their quasi-official status, however, has lent 
an air of credibility to hardline advocates who maintain that Article 
5.3 prohibits Parties from allowing both their international 
delegations and their domestic governments to lend an ear to tobacco 
interests. For example, when COP6 began to consider how to provide 
economically viable alternatives to tobacco farmers who depend on 
growing and selling tobacco to survive, international farming 
associations were outright excluded from providing input of any kind, 
solely because they had an economic interest in tobacco farming.66 Of 
                                                                                                             
62. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Decisions, 
A/FCTC/COP/2/DIV/9 (Sept. 20, 2007), http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC_COP2_
DIV9-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU25-EA2W] (archived Mar. 4, 2018). 
63. Id.  
64. Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶ 17. 
65. Id. ¶ 11.  
66.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], Decision, at 1, FCTC/ 
COP6(2) (Oct. 16, 2014) [hereinafter COP6(2)] (rejecting the application of the World 
Farmer’s Organization for observer status); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
[FCTC], Applications for the status of observer to the Conference of the Parties, at 3, 
FCTC/COP/6/3 (June 25, 2014) (describing the World Farmer Organization’s economic 
interests in the COP deliberations); Verbatim Records of Plenary Meetings, supra note 44, at 
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course they did! Much as labor unions have an economic interest in 
international labor policy—yet one could hardly imagine attempting 
to exclude unions (or business interests, for that matter) from 
participating in International Labour Organization (“ILO”) 
deliberations, solely because they have an economic interest in the 
matters under discussion. Economic interests should of course always 
be transparently disclosed so that conflicts of interest can be identified 
and considered when crafting policy, but it is senseless for 
policymakers to cut themselves off entirely from useful sources of 
data and information. And while advocates such as Dr. da Costa e 
Silva and the Convention Secretariat are of course free to label 
tobacco farmers a “malevolent” force if they wish,67 even such 
disfavored groups have civil rights of participation and association 
that are guaranteed by (among other treaties and conventions), the 
                                                                                                             
10 (remarks of delegate Mishra of India) (“I speak on behalf of the South-East Asia Region. 
As far as the farmers’ organization is concerned, we need to be a little guarded in the matter. In 
our view, the acceptance of the application from the organization at this stage, without 
adequate safeguards and mechanisms to ensure that there is no association with the tobacco 
industry, may be premature. We would like to clarify that the issues of engaging and helping 
farmers in the context of policy options and guidelines under Articles 17 and 18 are important, 
and need to be carefully considered. However, we need to block the entry of the tobacco 
industry in any manner whatsoever and therefore this decision to accept the application of the 
World Farmers Organization for conferring the status of observer may perhaps presently be 
premature.”); id. at 14 (remarks of delegate Kiptui of Kenya) (“The concerns that we have 
with this application as the African Region is that it is just a farmer organization, and as 
Uganda earlier mentioned, there is a risk of the tobacco industry entering through this 
organization, it is the opinion of the African Region that it is rejected until it proves that it has 
interest in tobacco control and not to intervene as a farmer organization, pushing the interest of 
tobacco farmers. Secondly, this organization has no information on tobacco control activities 
or even examples of diversification, and they have not proved to have any expertise in 
supporting diversification of tobacco farmers to healthier and more profitable crops or 
alternative livelihoods for tobacco farmers, and therefore we propose that it be rejected until a 
point where they have actually evidence and proof that they want to support tobacco control, 
and they can have demonstrable evidence of the work they have done, then it can be 
considered at that time.”); id. (adopting Kenya’s proposal to reject the World Farmers 
Organization’s application). 
67.  See Address by Dr. Vera da Costa e Silva, supra note 4. See also Model policy for 
agencies of the United Nations system on preventing tobacco industry interference, WORLD 
HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] TASK FORCE, http://www.who.int/ncds/un-task-
force/events/model-policy-agencies-united-nations1.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5XH-3RFK] 
(archived Mar. 4, 2018) (defining “tobacco industry” to include “tobacco growers, 
manufacturers, wholesale distributors and importers of tobacco products, including State-
owned, as well as lobbyists and associations”); Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
[FCTC], Implementation of Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC (July 27, 2016), 
http://www.who.int/fctc/cop/cop7/FCTC_COP_7_7_EN.pdf?ua=1 [https://perma.cc/CR8L-
V8DV] (archived Mar. 19, 2018). 
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights.68 These fundamental 
international law guarantees have been given next to no weight in 
COP proceedings, however; when a group of tobacco farmers showed 
up outside of the COP7 meetings in Delhi to peaceably protest their 
continuing exclusion from deliberations, the Convention Secretariat 
called upon security to round them up and bus them miles away, to a 
location where COP delegates could neither hear nor see them.69 
For the most extreme anti-tobacco advocates, it has not been 
enough merely to silence impacted groups from having a voice in 
policy debates. These advocates have pushed for a substantially 
deeper level of isolation for tobacco interests, demanding (oftentimes 
successfully) that any government official or international 
organization that has contact of any kind with the tobacco industry 
must itself be shunned, isolated, and barred from participating in 
FCTC proceedings. The goal of these advocates, of course, is to 
substantially disincentivize both domestic governments and 
international organizations from holding meetings with or otherwise 
listening to tobacco-affiliated interests, without regard to the topic 
under discussion. Application of this policy has, for example, resulted 
in the highly respected international law enforcement organization 
Interpol being excluded from the FCTC’s implementation discussions 
concerning the prevention of illicit trade in tobacco.70 Despite the fact 
that Interpol is perhaps the most prominent international organization 
in the world seeking to put a stop to the deeply problematic illicit 
trade in tobacco products, it has twice been denied credentials to 
participate in FCTC discussions concerning illicit trade solely because 
it occasionally cooperates with certain tobacco companies to track 
                                                                                                             
68.   See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 
1948), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf [https://
perma.cc/Z46W-QW3C] (archived Mar. 4, 2018) (“Everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression”); art. 20 (“Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly 
and association”); art. 21 (“Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his 
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives.”), art. 23 (“Everyone has the right to 
work”); art. 28 (“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”).  
69.  Lauren Southern, New attack on free speech in Delhi: Protesting tobacco farmers 
rounded up outside UN conference, then “dropped off in the middle of nowhere,” REBEL 
MEDIA (Nov. 8, 2016), https://www.therebel.media/delhi_protesting_tobacco_farmers
_rounded_up_outside_un_conference [https://perma.cc/C6FM-M4YV] (archived Mar. 4, 
2018). 
70.  FCTC, Possible amendments, supra note 42. 
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shipments.71 Whatever one may think of government cooperation 
with the tobacco industry as a general matter, combating illicit trade is 
clearly an area in which governments and the tobacco industry have a 
synergy of interests that makes cooperation sensible and perhaps even 
necessary. Tobacco product packaging and associated tracking 
mechanisms play a key role in preventing illicit trade,72 and there are 
aspects of law enforcement policies designed to combat illicit trade 
that necessarily require implementation by tobacco interests. 
The sovereign rights of State Parties to the Convention have 
enjoyed no immunity from the campaign to prevent industry 
perspective from infiltrating FCTC proceedings. Many State Parties 
to the Convention have state-run tobacco monopolies that play an 
important part in those countries’ national tobacco control efforts.73 
Not only are those monopolies directly impacted by the policies set 
forth in the Convention, but they also have a valuable perspective to 
offer on many of the Convention’s key tobacco control initiatives, 
including illicit trade. The Convention Secretariat let it be known 
heading into COP7, however, that State Parties no longer (in its view) 
enjoy the sovereign right to send delegates of their choosing to 
negotiating sessions; the Secretariat recommended that any delegates 
with ties to state-run tobacco monopolies or even links to tobacco 
farmers be denied credentials and barred from participating in 
negotiations.74 The Secretariat further recommended that all delegates 
and observers to COPs be required to fill out a “declaration of 
interest” form that the Secretariat could use to sniff out individuals 
that it deemed to be improperly affiliated with the tobacco industry 
and designate them for exclusion.75 This extraordinary proposal 
actually sparked some resistance from several of the delegations at 
COP7, which pointed out in response to the Secretariat’s proposal that 
                                                                                                             
71.   Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], INTERPOL’s application for 
the status of observer  to the Conference of the Parties, FCTC/COP/6/4 (June 12, 2014), 
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop6/FCTC_COP6_4-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/94JN-KPPP] 
(archived Mar. 4, 2018).  
72. See, e.g., FCTC, supra note 1, art. 15 (requiring all parties to the FCTC to adopt 
packaging and tracking measures to combat illicit trade in tobacco products). 
73.  For a WHO-published world map of state-run tobacco monopolies, which 
“represent a combined consumption of 2 billion cigarettes or 40 percent of the world’s total 
cigarette consumption,” see Tobacco Companies, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO], 
http://www.who.int/tobacco/en/atlas18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3D3X-PPHC] (archived Mar. 4, 
2018).  
74. FCTC/COP/7/30, supra note 32, ¶¶ 7-14. 
75. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. 
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Article 5.3 in fact does not say anything at all about exclusion, bans 
on participation, or limitations on the sovereign right to assemble 
representative delegations.76 The measure was accordingly tabled for 
further discussion at COP8—at which time the Secretariat is expected 
to take a second shot at using its considerable influence to push the 
measure through.77 
The Article 5.3 Guidelines seek not only to isolate and exclude 
tobacco interests from having any voice in policymaking, but also to 
prohibit them from engaging in and publicizing activities that might 
cause the public to view them in a favorable light. The FCTC itself 
expressly imposes a comprehensive ban on all tobacco advertising for 
all State Parties that are constitutionally able to do so.78 The Article 
5.3 Guidelines, however, purport to go substantially further, requiring 
all State Parties to adopt measures to prevent the tobacco industry 
from engaging in socially responsible activities, including corporate 
social responsibility.79 One report issued by the Convention 
Secretariat, for example, deplores Japan Tobacco International’s work 
with the ILO to “develop and implement activities that progressively 
eliminate child labour and address conditions that drive tobacco 
farmers to engage children in hazardous work.”80 The same report 
criticizes the UN Global Compact for accepting money from tobacco 
interests “to promote responsible corporate citizenship as one way to 
advance sustainable development,” and the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees for recognizing British-American Tobacco’s efforts to 
“generat[e] job opportunities for refugees.”81 Multiple parties to the 
Convention have been persuaded by this and other official documents 
to enact bans on tobacco companies making charitable contributions 
or engaging in corporate social responsibility.82 
The clear message: because it is essential that the public 
understand that the tobacco industry is unequivocally evil, 
                                                                                                             
76. FCTC, Report of the seventh session, supra note 52, ¶¶ 164-65, 167.   
77. Id. 
78. FCTC, supra  note 1, art. 13. 
79. Art. 5.3 Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶ 26-27 and Recommendations 6.1-6.3, at 7-8. 
80.  Framework Convention on Tobacco Control [FCTC], UN agencies and tobacco 
industry interference: Examples  of good practice from UN agencies, http://apps.who.int/fctc
/implementation/database/sites/implementation/files/documents/resources/UN%20agencies%2
0and%20tobacco%20industry%20interference.pdf [https://perma.cc/J7RZ-MUZT] (archived 
Mar. 4, 2018).  
81. Id.  
82. CAI Roadmap, supra note 55, at 2. 
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unprecedented steps must be taken to ensure that the industry is 
prevented as a matter of law from using its financial resources to do 
good. Whatever the merits of that idea, it is a rather curious 
application of Article 5.3, which calls on parties only “to protect 
[tobacco control] policies from commercial and other vested interests 
of the tobacco industry in accordance with national law.”83 Such a 
substantial interpretive leap, fraught with significant public policy 
consequences, would not under normal processes for the 
implementation of international law be accorded the imprimatur of 
any kind of official status without first being subjected to rigorous 
examination and debate. The Article 5.3 Guidelines, however, were 
adopted at COP3 with virtually no meaningful discussion, in large 
part because the “guidelines” were denominated non-binding, were 
not supposed to impose new legal obligations under international law, 
and were expressly noted to be “designed to assist Parties” in setting 
tobacco control policy.84 As described above, however, in practice the 
Article 5.3 Guidelines have in fact been accorded a much more 
substantive effect, and held up by partisans of all stripes—including 
the sophisticated Secretariat —as embodying rock-ribbed obligations 
that are binding on the State Parties to the Convention. The uses to 
which the Article 5.3 Guidelines have subsequently been put counsel 
in favor of much greater scrutiny by COP delegations of all future 
efforts to elaborate through official channels the meaning of the 
FCTC—including in particular COP7’s directive that the Secretariat 
should prepare another working document for COP8 to further 
develop the Article 5.3 Guidelines. 
B. Application of Article 5.3 to Achieve Purity and Isolation at the 
National Level 
The Article 5.3 Guidelines were also intended to bar tobacco 
interests from gaining access to national governments for purposes of 
influencing domestic law policymaking. Although, as noted above, 
the guidelines on this subject purport to be “recommendations” with 
no binding effect, they in fact expressly urge all Parties “to use and 
enforce mechanisms to ensure compliance with these guidelines, such 
                                                                                                             
83. FCTC, supra note 1, art. 5.3, at 7. 
84. Framework Convention on Tobacco Control, Decisions, (Feb. 16, 2009), 
http://apps.who.int/gb/fctc/PDF/cop2/FCTC_COP2_DIV9-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/AJ23-
LXXY] (archived Mar. 19, 2018).  
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as the possibility of bringing an action to court.”85 One does not 
“ensure compliance” with a guideline, or bring an action in court over 
failure to implement a mere recommendation. 
 In fact, a campaign of litigation and intimidation has been 
waged by advocates since the Article 5.3 Guidelines were first 
published to leverage the self-declared “recommendations” into 
practical mandates. For example, in September of 2014, the Youth 
Smoking Prevention Foundation sued the government of the 
Netherlands for its alleged failure to uphold Article 5.3 of the 
FCTC.86 The thrust of the complaint was that the Dutch government 
had allowed tobacco companies to have input into lawmaking, 
including through a non-public meeting that the minister of finance 
accepted with tobacco interests.87 The court in the Netherlands 
ultimately agreed that such standard government practices as holding 
informal meetings with constituents did not violate any provision of 
the FCTC, including Article 5.3.88 Advocates, however, were able to 
claim a substantive victory in the end, as the litigation generated 
immense public pressure and media attention concerning the 
purported international law “obligations” that had allegedly been 
violated, which influenced the Dutch government to adopt measures 
severely limiting communications between government officials and 
tobacco interests on a going-forward basis.89 
Other similar lawsuits have also been filed. All such court cases 
brought to date have (correctly, in my view) been dismissed as 
meritless.90 The interest groups supporting them, however, continue 
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to seek to leverage the Article 5.3 Guidelines, both inside and outside 
the courtroom, to persuade national governments to adopt measures 
starkly singling out tobacco-affiliated interests for a unique form of 
public policy isolation that deprives them both of any voice in 
policymaking and of any access to those in positions with lawmaking 
authority.91 
After years of observable practice, it is now also clear that the 
radical campaign of secrecy and exclusion that the Convention 
Secretariat and like-minded NGOs have been pursuing is, at times, 
producing decidedly perverse policy outcomes. When efforts to end 
child labor and to provide employment to refugees are sacrificed at 
the altar of isolating and stigmatizing tobacco interests, when Interpol 
is banned from participating in discussions about ending illicit trade 
because of its perceived taint from innocuous collaboration with 
tobacco companies on tracking their products, and when a resolution 
urging that governmental regulations of e-cigarettes and vaping 
devices should be supported by evidence-based science is voted down 
out of concern that science would not support the desired regulatory 
outcomes,92 a re-examination of the implementation process that is 
currently being employed is clearly called for.  Indeed, it is 
demanded. 
VI. ESTABLISHED NORMS OF TRANSPARENCY IN 
INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATIONS 
To summarize the above, through the last several COPs, FCTC 
policymaking has become increasingly non-transparent. The public 
has been shut out. The media has been shut out. Organizations and 
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individuals even remotely associated with tobacco interests have been 
banned. And records of FCTC implementation deliberations have 
been increasingly stripped bare, to the point that future COPs can be 
expected to produce only summary reports for all subsidiary body 
working groups, which will report on ultimate conclusions and 
outcomes, but will not provide any means for the public, the media, or 
affected groups to discern which organizations or delegations were 
the primary drivers of the policies that were ultimately adopted, what 
the supporting reasons were, who expressed dissenting views, or why 
those views were overcome.93   
The increasing move towards non-transparency and exclusion at 
the FCTC COPs is a stark departure from the norm for international 
negotiations, and is entirely irreconcilable with the transparency 
principles that the WHO and the Convention Secretariat themselves 
espouse as an essential means of identifying and combating tobacco 
industry machinations. The highly regarded International Law 
Association has promulgated best practices for international 
negotiations (called the Recommended Rules and Practices, or 
“RRPs”) that are drawn from the experience of respected academics 
and judges from a wide variety of states.94 The RRPs provide that 
“[n]ormative decisions of an [international organization, or “IO”] 
should as a general rule be adopted by a public vote.”95 They further 
call for IOs to transparently state the reasons supporting all decisions 
made: “Organs of an IO are under an obligation to state reasons for 
their decisions,” and “[n]on-plenary organs should reflect in their 
reports information of a non-confidential nature forming the basis of 
their decisions.”96 According to the RRPs, openness, transparency, 
and objectivity are essential elements of a well-tuned international 
negotiation process: “Non-plenary organs acting on behalf of the 
whole membership under the governing provisions of an 
[international organization] have a special obligation to act as 
transparently as possible, and should reduce as far as possible the 
number of non-public meetings.”97 “An [international organization] 
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should conduct its institutional and operational activities in a manner 
which is objective and impartial and can be seen to be so.”   
The General Assembly of the United Nations, perhaps the most 
widely known and respected international governing body in the 
world, has demonstrated through decades of practice how well these 
principles can operate. Article 60 of the UN General Assembly Rules 
of Procedure is similar to the FCTC’s Article 32, and provides that 
“the meetings of the General Assembly and its Main Committees 
shall be held in public unless the organ concerned decides that 
exceptional circumstances require that the meeting be held in private. 
Meetings of other committees and subcommittees shall also be held in 
public unless the organ concerned decides otherwise.”98 While 
meetings of the General Assembly are, on rare occasion, closed to 
public observation for security reasons, the UN has demonstrated its 
commitment to transparency in recent years by using modern 
technology to stream nearly all General Assembly meetings on the 
Internet.99 
Nor is the UN the only relevant example; openness and 
transparency have also proven effective for implementing multilateral 
framework conventions. COP21 of the Climate Change Framework, 
for example, has been lauded as an immense success, in no small part 
because it employed a process that valued inclusion, debate and 
diversity of opinion. Proceedings were entirely open to journalists and 
accredited intergovernmental bodies,100 and the COP allowed 
thousands of organizations to be accredited, including industry groups 
representing a wide variety of viewpoints.101 In addition, a large space 
called the Climate Generations Area was set up at COP21 so that civil 
society could openly share opinions, debate, and even (gasp!) attempt 
to influence the Parties who were actively involved in the 
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negotiations.102 This investment in transparency and inclusion paid 
dividends, allowing a level of agreement on sound policy to be 
achieved at COP21 that had previously eluded the Climate Change 
Framework. The FCTC and its implementing bodies would do well to 
pay attention to the measurable level of real world success achieved 
by this markedly different procedural approach. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The FCTC is intended to pursue unquestionably noble public 
health goals. Its implementation process, however, is deeply broken, 
departs markedly from established norms of international law, and 
needs to be fixed. The parties to the Convention should use the 
opportunity presented by COP8 to correct their procedural course at 
both the international and national levels. 
At the international level, transparency and openness should be 
restored to the work of the COP, with full confidence that sound 
policies with a solid evidentiary basis will prevail in an open 
exchange of ideas. And at the level of domestic law implementation, 
the guidelines interpreting Article 5.3 should be revisited and revised 
to ensure faithfulness to the provision’s text and the intent of the State 
Parties that negotiated it. Indeed, such a review is contemplated by 
the guidelines themselves, which state that they “should be reviewed 
and revised periodically to ensure that they continue to provide 
effective guide… .”103 
What might revised Article 5.3 guidelines look like? A detailed 
exegesis is beyond the scope of this article, but certain core principles 
emerge from a review of relevant international instruments and 
practice. The implementation of domestic tobacco control policy 
should, of course, be protected from illicit practices such as bribery 
and corruption. Transparency measures that allow economic conflicts 
of interest to be recognized and taken into account by policymakers 
also have an established pedigree and have proven highly effective. 
What should be avoided, however, is a continuation of the campaign 
of secrecy and exclusion that has characterized the last eight years of 
Article 5.3 implementation. The continued use of such a broken and 
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exclusionary policymaking process will serve only to destabilize 
established norms for the creation of international law, and if history 
is any guide in the long run will in the long run undermine the 
efficacy of public health outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
